China Preferred Over U.S. as ASEAN Partner Amid Rising Discontent: Survey Shows Southeast Asia’s Shift

United States and ASEAN | Report Syndication

Brief-Article | REPORT SYNDICATION

Recent statements from U.S. officials highlight a “new convergence” with Asian partners, citing improved relations with Japan, South Korea, and stronger NATO-Asia security links. However, recent data reveals that the U.S. is losing ground in Southeast Asia. According to The State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey Report published by the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, for the first time, more ASEAN respondents preferred China (50.5%) over the U.S. (49.5%) when asked which country ASEAN should align with if forced to choose.

Since 2023, the U.S. has notably lost support in Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Brunei. Conversely, the U.S. still enjoys strong backing in the Philippines (83%), Vietnam (79%), and Singapore (62%). The sharpest declines in U.S. support are observed in Muslim-majority countries, where sentiment shifted significantly, possibly influenced by U.S. support for Israel in the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Recent findings and conversations reveal growing discontent with U.S. policies in Southeast Asia, particularly concerning the Gaza conflict. A survey indicates that, for the first time, more ASEAN respondents (50.5%) favor aligning with China over the U.S. (49.5%). This sentiment is reflected in regional diplomacy:

  • Indonesia and Malaysia: Diplomats from these countries have expressed strong criticism of U.S. policy on Gaza. In Malaysia, anger over U.S. support for Israel has led to a preference for China, with many Malaysians boycotting American brands.
  • Cambodia: Despite a 18 percentage point drop in U.S. alignment preference, some Cambodians still value U.S. support for democracy, though U.S. influence is overshadowed by China’s extensive economic investments and strategic partnerships in the country.
  • Vietnam: While the U.S. upgraded its ties with Vietnam, China has maintained a robust strategic partnership with Hanoi, which has recently deepened its cooperation with China.
  • Laos: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, including a new railway, are well-received in Laos, highlighting China’s growing influence and positive local impact compared to the U.S.

The dissatisfaction with U.S.’s Middle East policy and China’s growing economic and strategic footprint are reshaping regional alignments in Southeast Asia.

China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia is significantly undermining the United States’ ability to engage effectively in the region and globally. Key points include:

  • ASEAN’s Cautious Stance: Despite China’s aggressive actions in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, ASEAN has refrained from directly condemning China.
  • Impact on Global Issues: The U.S. struggles to gain Southeast Asian support for condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or its Middle East policies. Regional countries often echo Russian or Chinese viewpoints, reflecting skepticism towards U.S. motives.
  • Perception Issues: Southeast Asians view the U.S. as having double standards and self-interested policies, which hampers its efforts to garner support on international issues and reflects poorly on its global image.

To regain support in Southeast Asia, the United States needs to address several key areas:

  • Avoid Overstating Convergence: The U.S. should be cautious about emphasizing the narrative of alignment with Asian partners, as it may indicate a lack of awareness of its declining influence in the region or suggest that Southeast Asia is being neglected in U.S. foreign policy.
  • Economic Engagement: Southeast Asian countries prioritize economic ties for security. The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute survey shows 60% of respondents view China as the most influential economic power in the region, compared to just 14% for the U.S. Enhancing economic outreach through increased trade and investment is crucial, especially following recent U.S. diplomatic visits.
  • Responding to Chinese Actions: The U.S. should focus on clear, justified responses to Chinese actions that undermine U.S. interests or breach international law, ensuring these responses are proportionate and well-explained to avoid unnecessary confrontation or economic disruption.
  • Addressing Disinformation: To counter Chinese disinformation effectively, the U.S. needs to address the underlying issues that make such narratives resonate, particularly in the context of its own foreign policy decisions.
  • Strategic Engagement: The U.S. must convert the ongoing desire of Southeast Asian countries to engage with it into strategic benefits. Despite current challenges, the U.S. presence in the region remains vital for regional security and prosperity.

Overall, regaining influence in Southeast Asia will be challenging but is crucial for U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, a region central to the broader competition with China.